The Civil and the Sacred

ERNEST GELLNER

The Tanner Lectures on Human Values

Delivered at

Harvard University
March 20–21, 1990
Atlantic civilization, as it exists on both shores of the North Atlantic, has a number of distinctive features with which it proudly identifies: political, economic, and ideological pluralism are conspicuous among them. These pluralities are interdependent in various complex ways and are not necessarily and always in complete harmony with each other. For instance, ideological pluralism requires the toleration of political trends hostile to economic pluralism. But in general, one might say that all three of them require and presuppose the presence of something called “civil society,” a notion which has acquired a new salience in recent decades. I do not wish to delve into the history of the term or of the idea, but merely, to begin with, bring out its contemporary content and highlight the features of our situation which has endowed that content with its importance.

Civil society, in the relevant sense, is first of all that part of society which is not the state. It is a residue. But there is of course more to it than that. We would not use this appellation to characterize any old residue, in any society endowed with political centralization. The notion of civil society which is so significant for us contains further elements: namely, that this residue is large, powerful, and organized. An atomized or powerless residue would fail to qualify. But some other kinds of residue would also fail to count.

We possess this much-prized entity, and we are proud of it. The idea contains the assumption that civil society in question is not supine and powerless vis à vis the state but, on the contrary, that it is in a position to ensure that the state does its job but no more, and that it does it properly. Contained in all this is the idea that the personnel occupying state positions are periodically rotated in a manner only partly influenced and above all not con-
trolled by the personnel themselves. In brief, we believe we have *accountable* government. The authority of government as a set of institutions is not identifiable with the authority of the persons temporarily occupying governmental posts. The personnel can be called to account for the performance of the duties linked to their posts.

All this is related to economic and ideological pluralism. The capacity of the civil residue to check and control government clearly hinges not merely on “formal” procedural rules, such as elections, which confer the right to rotate personnel; it also depends on the existence, within the residue, of persons, groups, or institutions possessed of resources sufficient to enable them to take advantage of the formal procedural rules. It also seems to require ideological pluralism: if any doctrine or idea-carrying institution could claim monopoly of truth or access to truth, this once again could and would inhibit the exercise of checks on government. A unique truth, identified by procedures which are themselves under governmental control, can then validate government and its procedure in a way which precludes criticism, by damning it a priori. In practice it is recognized that civil society does not actually preclude its members from revering the sacred but does not allow them to invoke it too much, or with excessive insistence, in political debate. Citizens of liberal societies are not forbidden to feel moral outrage, or even to express it in public; but they are not really allowed to use it as a terminal decision procedure in debate.

All this is commonplace. I have no pretension to offering any kind of innovation in the theory of the democratic-liberal state and society. If I have offered a brief sketch of it, it was merely for purposes of contrast. Atlantic society is at present committed to a theory and a form of organization along these lines, though no doubt others might prefer to formulate it in different words. But that is not at issue now.

The present aim is different. Atlantic society, or in particular its European territorial implantation, has two neighbors on its
eastern and southeastern borders: Marxist and Muslim societies. These societies share a very important trait: they are, both of them, endowed with weak (on occasion, some observers have claimed, nonexistent) civil societies. Some have expressed the wish that these collectivities should acquire their own civil societies and that their absence, complete or partial, is a tragedy. I hope to illuminate the idea of a civil society, not by looking at what happens in places in which it is said to exist, but by looking at what happens when it is said to be, wholly or in part, absent.

Let us begin by looking at what some of our influential intellectual ancestors have said about the presence or absence of political pluralism in the East as such. It is always interesting, and sometimes very illuminating, to observe great and perceptive thinkers making assertions which are diametrically opposed to each other. If the affirmations are indeed blatantly contradictory, they cannot both of them, so logic tells us, be true; but if the two thinkers in question are indeed very perceptive and profound, then the very error of at least one of them, or possibly the partial errors of both of them, should be enlightening. The two thinkers I have in mind are Machiavelli and Tocqueville. We find them affirming ideas dramatically in conflict with each other.

In *The Prince*, Niccolò Machiavelli observes: “all principalities known to history are governed in one of two ways, either by a prince to whom everyone is subservient . . . or by a prince and by nobles whose rank is established not by favour of the prince but by their ancient lineage. Such nobles have states and subjects of their own.”

The two main examples offered by Machiavelli of the former type are ancient Persia and contemporary Turkey. The tendency to such centralization seems to be found typically in the East, and Machiavelli makes himself open to the charge of being one of the initiators of “Orientalism” in some pejorative sense. Such centralized oriental monarchies are, in his view, difficult to invade and conquer, but once held, easy to maintain in a state of subjection.
Power so concentrated does not fragment easily at first, but once overcome, there is nothing left to oppose and challenge the new rule.

Things are altogether different, says Machiavelli, in a country such as France, fragmented into subunits within which each local ruler is endowed with his own power base. Making use of some malcontent among such barons, an invader would find it easy to enter the country with his aid, but even if victory is secured over the erstwhile central ruler, the new monarch’s hold is and remains precarious. The local patrons are as liable to defy him as they were to defy his hapless predecessor. This contrast between a centralized oriental despotism and the complex structure of a feudal state, with its many and independent centers of power, and with an apex which does not properly dominate the rest, is easy to grasp, and it would indeed seem to have the consequences for stability and its absence which Machiavelli spells out.

But Alexis de Tocqueville, as impressive an observer as Machiavelli, seems to have reached the very opposite conclusion: “Un émir ne commande point, comme les rois de l’Europe, à des particuliers dont chacun peut-être comprime isolement par la force sociale dont le prince dispose, mais à des tribus qui sont des petites nations complètement organisées [An emir does not command, like European kings, individuals, each of whom can be constrained in isolation by the social authority at the disposal of the prince. Instead, he commands tribes, each of which is a little nation, fully organized].” And Tocqueville goes on: “La plus grande difficulté que rencontre un prince qui veut gouverner une confédération des tribus arabes est celle-ci: A chaque instant il est exposé à trouver devant lui une force organisée qui lui risiste [The great difficulty faced by a prince who wishes to govern a confederation of Arab tribes is the following: at each moment, he is liable to find himself faced by an organized force which can resist him].” And to clinch it all, in striking contrast with Machiavelli’s position: “En Algérie . . . il n’y a point de ville ni de position importantes dont
on puisse s’emparer à la demeure. . . . Avec eux la guerre ne peut donc finir avec un seul coup. Si Abd-el-Kader est détruit, il ne le sera jamais qu’avec l’aide de quelques-uns des tribus qui lui sont aujourd’hui soumises; le faisceau de sa puissance sera délié plutôt que brisé [In Algeria . . . there are no towns or important locations which one can permanently occupy . . . consequently, a war cannot be finished at one fell swoop. If Abd-el-Kader is ever destroyed, it will only be with the help of some of those tribes which at present are subjected to him; it is easier to slacken the links of his power than to tear them asunder]. 1

Machiavelli has discerned in the East what we might now call a patrimonial state, and Tocqueville, a segmentary one. No doubt both were there, ready to be found, at different times and in different places. The diverse types of pluralism each of them identified, and which they both contrasted with the patrimonial state, do not resemble each other overmuch. So the patrimonial state would seem to have not one but many antitheses. But notwithstanding their shared pluralism, neither of these contrasted social orders really qualifies as a “civil society.” It is civil society which interests us now because it is so ardently desired in eastern Europe and because we also desire it (whether or not it is desired locally) for the Muslim world and because they are embarrassed and pained by its absence. (Those people, we tend to feel, would be so much easier to deal with if only they had a civil society. The segmentary world which Tocqueville found in Algeria consists of relatively egalitarian tribes, mininations in his view, with only weak leadership; the feudal world in the France of the fifteenth century, to which both Tocqueville and Machiavelli refer, is much more profoundly stratified, with a far greater separation of warriors and of agricultural producers.

Why exactly does neither of these qualify as a “civil society”? Why would neither of them satisfy us? The answer seems to be

simple: each of them suffers from status-rigidity. In our civil society, what we require, among other things, are civil liberties, and these include the requirement that none of us should be firmly locked into a given social position. Few of us would relish being confined to one of the statuses of a feudal order, or to be obliged, in our economic, legal, political, marital, and ritual lives, ever to fall in with our patrilateral cousins, in the manner of the tribesmen whom Tocqueville watched from afar. The civil society we know and love is paradoxical at least twice over: it constitutes a countervailing force to the state (in that respect at any rate resembling the old forms of pluralism we repudiate), yet it is itself peaceful and, normally, unarmed; and it contains powerful associations, institutions, and groupings, though none of these social subunits possess, so to speak, a preemptive, prescriptive right over its members. Membership is optional or revocable. Citizens are free to join civil societies or leave them at will, just as they are free in the choice of their brides or companions or partners. They do not even swear oaths of loyalty on joining them (with rare and residual exceptions, usually of a somewhat folkloristic character, as in the case of Cambridge colleges).

Although the pluralistic contrasts to centralized despotism noted by Machiavelli and Tocqueville do not qualify for the status of “civil society” in our terms, one may well ask whether they are its ancestors or predecessors. Or perhaps one may ask, Which one of them is its ancestor? Had one asked this question prior to the actual emergence of the modern world and its civil society, one might well have been tempted to give the wrong answer and to plump for segmentary society as the precursor of modern democracy and enlightenment. There are some moral resemblances. Segmentary societies tend to be egalitarian and participatory; some of them even indulge in the rhetoric of liberty. Surely we must look to them for our moral ancestors! The actors in the French Revolution did indeed look to the segmentary classical society for their model.
Fustel de Coulanges wrote his *Ancient City* partly in order to destroy this illusion, fostered by some thinkers of the Enlightenment and widespread among the participants in the French Revolution. But the similarity of freedom in the ancient Mediterranean city, with its segmentation-based liberties, and that of modern free society is in reality negligible, and Fustel did his best to highlight this. The ancients may indeed have spoken of liberty and liberties, like their latter-day followers; but they took for granted a texture of daily life which moderns would have found intolerably stifling. The citizen of a modern society does not wish to see his membership of his overall community mediated by a whole number of subgroups, each confirmed by obligatory rituals and marked and defined by obligatory styles of conduct. He may like a little bit of that kind of thing, a touch of theater here or there, not taking it altogether seriously, in connection with his Masonic lodge or college fraternity; but if *all* the rights and duties of his social and political life were defined by such an intricate web of membership and ritual, he would probably find it intolerable.

So this is not what we want, and more important, this is not what we have. Nor is there any historic record of a direct transition from a segmentary society to modern civil society. A complex historical development stands between the ancient Mediterranean city, and even between the medieval independent city, and modern civil society. Segmentary society did survive longer on the southern shores of the Mediterranean, among the Muslim tribes of North Africa, and some of its most perceptive investigators commented on its affinities with antiquity.² How does one proceed from the segmentary society, if not to civil society, at any rate to something else?

Here we may return to Tocqueville, and to Fustel de Coulanges; and we can also consult one of the most interesting of the classics,

by David Hume, in a part of his work which is normally little considered. Tocqueville first. The man who saw so clearly the long progress of France toward centralization, a development of which the Revolution was but one late expression, was well equipped to note parallel processes on the other shore of the Mediterranean: “Abd-el-Kader . . . agit vis-à-vis des tribus précisément comme nos rois et en particulier Charles VII ont agi contre la féodalité. Il crée des compagnies d’ordonnance. Et à l’aide des cette force indépendante il abat en détail les petites puissances qui réunies lui feraient aisément la loi [Abd-el-Kader . . . acts toward the tribes precisely in the manner in which our kings, and in particular Charles VII, acted against the feudal lords. He creates regular units. With the help of that independent force he destroys one by one the little powers which, united, could easily impose their will on him].”

But the parallel is not complete. The mechanism by means of which European monarchs reduced the barons is not quite the same as that by means of which the emir strove to reduce the tribes, and by means of which a unity was in the end forged in Algeria out of plurality. The European monarchs, though they used prelates as bureaucrats, did not use religion as an ideological charter of unification. In the North, state-building was not a crusade, or at any rate not in early modern times, which concerned Tocqueville. By contrast, on that southern shore of the Mediterranean, where segmentary societies survived so much longer, unification very characteristically did assume the form of a jihad. Society was unified, and the central state imposed, by blackening the dissident pluralists as heretics rather than rebels.

La grande difficulté pour gouverner ces peuples, c’est de faire naître et d’exploiter chez eux un sentiment commun ou une idée commune à tous, à l’aide desquels on puisse les tenir tous ensemble et les pousser tous à la foi de même côté. La seule idée commune qui puisse servir de lien entre toutes les tribus qui

3 Tocqueville, *De la colonie en Algérie*, p. 72.
nous entourent, c’est la religion. . . . Le prince qui gouvernera ces tribus sera toujours d’autant plus puissant et d’autant plus paisible dans son pouvoir, qu’il exaltera davantage et enflamméra plus violemment ces sentiments communs et ces idées communes. . . . L’histoire nous montre d’ailleurs qu’on n’a jamais pu faire en commun de grandes choses aux arabes que par ce procédé. C’est ainsi qu’a agi Mahomet, ainsi les premiers califes, ainsi les différents princes qui se sont successivement élevés sur la côte d’Afrique dans le Moyen Age.

[The great issue in governing such populations is to encourage within them and to exploit a common feeling or an idea shared by all, with the hope of which could hold them together and propel them all at once in the same direction. The only shared idea which could serve as a link among all the tribes which surround us, is religion . . . a prince who will govern these tribes will always be the more powerful, and the more at peace in the enjoyment of this power, the more he exalts and excites those shared sentiments and shared ideas. . . . Moreover, history shows us that it is never possible to make Arabs achieve great things jointly other than by such means. It was in this way that Mohammed acted, as well as the early Khalifes, as well as the various princes who emerged in succession on the African coast during the Middle Ages.]

Fustel de Coulanges was in due course to describe a similar, but in his case permanent and definitive, transition from segmentation to unification by religion in the classical period of the Mediterranean basin. What distinguished the traditional Muslim world of the arid zone is that the transition from the one to the other was always temporary, always in the end reversed: there was not a conclusive development from one thing to another, but instead, a permanent oscillation. One can go further and say that in such a world, segmentary pluralism and tolerant diversity were not a stage, to be followed by a politically and ideologically centralized condition; rather, the two conditions characteristically coexisted side by side, the one prevailing in the towns, the other among the

\[4\] Ibid.
tribes. There was a “flux and reflux” between them, one or the other being dominant successively, in a wavelike pattern, but neither one of them ever fully disappearing.

Here, the theoretician who is most illuminating on this point is David Hume, in his little used—much praised but in fact not much read—Natural History of Religion. In it, Hume interestingly but mistakenly consigns mankind forever to an eternal pendulum swing between monotheistic centralism and a more tolerant pluralism. He was right about traditional Islam at any rate, if not about mankind in general. He concentrates on the doctrinal and psychological aspects of the matter, but his vision of diversified, tolerant, traditional “polytheism” clearly corresponds to our notion of segmentary society. Tocqueville was primarily concerned with one particular transition, which he saw on the horizon, and which he was anxious to prevent (namely, Abd-el-Kader’s unification of Algeria by religion and by standing army); but he also clearly and rightly saw this as a repeat performance of something that had happened among the Arabs many times before. Fustel was concerned with one big transformation of segmentary society into a unified one, committed to a centralized faith. It was Hume, however, long before either Tocqueville or Fustel, who had explicitly formulated a general theory of this kind of transition.

A transition to what? Segmentary society does not in fact lead, at any rate directly, to that civil society which remains our main concern, even while exploring alternatives to it. The condition to which segmentary society does sometimes flip over, forever (Fustel), or for a time only, as part of an eternal swing forward and back (Hume), we may call, using the Arabic term, an Umma. It is a society unified by an ardently held faith, where that faith itself is ordered, codified, and delimited with a neat structure and a clearly dominant apex. To be so unified it needs to be codified, it needs to be expressed in doctrine rather than tale and ritual, and for all that, it needs scribes. So all this can come about only within a society where writing and scribes are already available.
The interesting contrast between Machiavelli and Tocqueville, one of them seeing oriental society as essentially lacking pluralism and the other seeing it as overendowed with it, has shown that in the traditional world, the central monarchical state is in competition not with one but with more than one kind of plural fragmented political world. These various types may have quite different potentials for further development. Segmentary societies, in conjunction with the kind of ecological condition which prevails in the arid zone and which favors pastoralism, seem to have led to a permanent oscillation rather than to any irreversible and definitive transition.

In the work of Hume, we find another contradiction (this time quite unambiguously a contradiction rather than merely a contrast, which would lead to contradiction had it been firmly generalized). The contradiction exists between his *Natural History of Religion* and the remarkable essay *Of Superstition and Enthusiasm*, the ideas of which are also to be found in his *History of England*. It is in *The Natural History of Religion* that one finds his principal and best-elaborated, so to speak, central theory. The key idea is similar to that later found in the observations of Tocqueville already quoted, and in Fustel. It all hinges on a contrast between the type of religion exemplified by the ancient Mediterranean city —namely, pluralistic, tolerant, unpuritanical, unscripturalist, permitting and indeed encouraging a wide proliferation of the sacred —and, on the other hand, a monotheistic, monopolistic, puritan, exclusive, scripturalist faith. One leads to, or expresses, segmentary community, and the other, a charismatic, proselytizing society.

There can hardly be any doubt about where Hume’s own sympathies lay: the former type of religion promoted civic virtue and mutual toleration; the latter was egoistic and other-worldly in orientation. These values Hume shared with his contemporary Edward Gibbon, and much later with the great anthropologist who can be defined as the fusion of Hume’s psychology with massive
ethnographic documentation — namely, Sir James Frazer. The weakness of Hume’s position here is that it is excessively psychologistic: he deduces everything from the proclivities of the human heart, with scant concern for the role of social structure. Hume’s strength is that he formulates it all as a general theory.

The political implications of either alternative are obvious, or so it seemed to Hume at the time he was writing *The Natural History*:

The tolerating spirit of idolaters, both in ancient and in modern times, is very obvious to any one, who is in the least conversant with the writings of historians and travellers. When the oracle of Delphi was asked, what rites or worship was most acceptable to the gods? Those which are legally established in each city, replied the oracle. Even priests, in those ages, could, it seems, allow salvation to those of the different communion. The Romans commonly adopted the gods of conquered people; and never disputed the attributes of those local and national deities, in whose territories they resided. The intolerance of all religions, which have maintained the unity of God, is as remarkable as the contrary principle of the polytheists.  

The position is lucid and emphatic. It might be called the Augustan view. Tolerant and civic pluralism is to be preferred to fanatical, intolerant unitarianism. There are contexts in which such a view is still relevant to current issues, to this very day. I have heard it in India: it provided the premise for praising Hindu humanism in contrast to Muslim intolerance. Or it can be found in the context of the contemporary Turkish Kulturkampf, in the form of praise of Anatolian folk religion, as opposed to the scholastic rigidity of urban Ottoman theologians. In a society in which the available options were indeed exhausted by the two poles of the pendulum swing sketched out by Hume, such a position might indeed be very attractive.

But the world we actually live in is somewhat richer. Its options are not limited to segmentary pluralism on the one hand,

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and to the doctrinaire unitarianism of the *Umma* on the other. Hume noticed this fact, though it contradicted his principal theory. On his main account, pluralists were meant, in general, to be tolerant, while unitarians were meant to be intolerant. If this is so, how on earth can you explain the tolerance practiced by the Dutch and the English, notwithstanding the fact that in religion they are predominantly Protestants and tend toward unitarian scripturalisms?

In *The Natural History of Religion*, Hume, with commendable honesty, already notes the problem but disposes of it in a quick, perfunctory, and unsatisfactory manner: “if, among CHRISTIANS, the ENGLISH and DUTCH have embraced the principles of toleration, this singularity has proceeded from the steady resolution of the civil magistrate, in opposition to the continued efforts of priests and bigots.”

This really won’t do. A “singularity” it certainly is, and clearly a most important one. But simply to invoke the resolution of some civil magistrates is too facile. In the essay on superstition and enthusiasm, Hume carries out a much more determined, serious, and illuminating assault on the problem. In virtue of this handling of the issue, Hume can rightly be classed among the sociologists who first raised the question of the distinctive role of Protestantism in the birth of the modern world. Note that we have in the main been dealing with thinkers preoccupied with societies within which the miracle of the initial emergence of civil society did not occur; we are now considering a thinker who, in his main theory, resembles them, but who in a sideline of his thought, came to face the oddity and distinctiveness of civil society, namely his own, which was unitarian-scripturalist and not segmentary, but which was nevertheless tolerant!

When reading the essay on superstition and enthusiasm, with its much more determined attempt at handling the problem, it is necessary to clarify his terminology: by *enthusiasm*, he means scripturalist puritanical zeal of the Protestant type, and by *super-
stition, he means that melange of manipulation of nature by magic and the management of society by ritual which, especially in Protestant eyes, characterizes both paganism and popery.

He proceeds to formulate three important and interesting generalizations. The first one affirms that superstition favors priestly power, whereas enthusiasm undermines it even more than does rational skepticism! In other words, if you want to get rid of priests, puritans will serve you better than philosophers. If your aim is to eliminate hieratic power (which was, after all, the great aspiration of the Enlightenment), then the Protestant leveling of all believers, and the universalization of priesthood, is the best method. (He did not anticipate the fact that in superstitious countries outright rationalism could produce a secular countersuperstition and a new secular priesthood.)

His second proposition anticipates the doctrine of the Routinization of Charisma, though with an important refinement — to the effect that enthusiastic religions are more given to such routinization than superstitious ones (in his sense). At the start they are indeed fast and furious, but they calm down with time, whereas superstition tends to maintain a steady level of excitement throughout. The third proposition — and here he comes into headlong collision with the central position of his own larger study — is that enthusiasm favors civil liberty, and superstition harms it. His reflections on the contrast between the classical polis and the religious regimes which followed it had led him to the very opposite conclusion; but looking at modern times, and the role of the Dutch and the English in them — and Tocqueville in due course added the Americans with even greater emphasis— takes him in the contrary direction. Hume goes on to illustrate his new discovery not merely from English, but also from French history (in other words from a region where superstition prevailed and freedom was largely lost) :

The Molinists, conducted by the Jesuits, are great friends to superstition . . . and devoted to the authority of the priests, and
to tradition. The Jansenists are enthusiasts, . . . little influenced by authority; and, in a word, but half Catholics. The consequences are exactly conformable to the foregoing reasoning. The Jesuits are the tyrants of the people, and slaves of the court; and the Jansenists preserve alive the small sparks of the love of liberty which are to be found in the French nation.7

The attempt to come to terms with the contradiction, with the conflict between the vision inspired by the ancients and the one inspired by the moderns, is now much more serious. The first element in the explanation is supplied, as indicated, by routinization:

It is thus enthusiasm produces the most cruel disorders in human society; but its fury is like that of thunder and tempest, which exhaust themselves in a little time, and leave the air more calm and serene than before. When the first fire of enthusiasm is spent, men naturally, in all fanatical sects, sink into the greatest remissness and coolness in sacred matters; there being no body of men among them endowed with sufficient authority, whose interest is concerned to support the religious spirit . . . our sectaries, who were formerly such dangerous bigots, are now become very free reasoners.8

The explanation is not quite complete or sufficient, but it is a good start. He might have added a few factors which to us now look like important contributions to the routinization, to the cooling-off process of the enthusiasts: the fact that the Puritans lost their civil war and in the end failed to impose their rule but did not lose altogether and found themselves within a balance of power in which mutual toleration seemed to be the best bet to most parties; that the wider political economy of Europe hindered the imposition of one orthodoxy overall and rewarded those au-

8 Ibid.
authorities which received minorities fleeing from persecution. Hume notes some of the alignments:

The leaders of the Whigs have . . . been . . . friends to toleration, and indifferent to any particular sect of Christians: while the sectaries, who have all a strong tincture of enthusiasm, have always, without exception, concurred with that party in defence of civil liberty. The resemblance in their superstitions long united the High-Church Tories and the Roman Catholics, in support of prerogative and kingly power; though experience of the tolerating spirit of the Whigs seem of late to have reconciled the Catholics to that party. ⁹

So Hume evidently does deserve a place among those who explored the connections between the Reformation and the emergence of our world, civil society and all. But our concern here is to add to our understanding of the preconditions of civil society, not so much by adding to the existing enormous literature concerning its emergence in the places where it does exist but by looking at the places where it is lacking or is insufficiently present: in particular, Muslim and Marxist societies. And it is in this field, and especially in connection with Islam, that Hume’s main position provides a great deal of illumination.

The process which Tocqueville predicted in Algeria (and, from the French viewpoint, feared) has in fact come to pass. Algeria is now united, and not merely in the superficial and political sense. The multiple fragmented and warring subcommunities, noted by Tocqueville, have largely evaporated, and their erstwhile members have been induced to make common cause and to identify as members of one overarching society (national or religious?) by the method Tocqueville did not yet call, like his great French successor, the acquisition of collective representations. Tocqueville spoke only of shared ideas. Moreover, this has happened not merely in Algeria but, with not very significant variations in detail, throughout the Muslim world.

⁹ Ibid.
One of the most conspicuous and significant facts concerning our contemporary world is that, while the sociologists’ secularization thesis is all in all valid, one major part of the world remains resolutely secularization-resistant: the world of Islam. Today, the hold of Islam over the societies and the minds of Muslims is at least as great as it was one or two centuries ago; in certain ways, it is probably more, not less, powerful. The Western world has noticed this, if at all, only under the impact of the Iranian revolution. But it has still hardly appreciated the extent of this phenomenon and certainly has neither grasped nor understood its nature.

Westerners tend to speak of fundamentalism, but that is a rather misleading word. The term has acquired its meaning and associations in a Western context, in conditions of widespread secularization, where it is customary to distinguish between fundamentalists, strange and uncouth creatures recruited largely from the educationally less favored strata of society, and ordinary, more civilized and sophisticated believers, who have come to grasp that religious beliefs subsist in some realm disconnected from ordinary conviction. Precisely what is and what is not within that realm, and to what extent, and in what context, remains ambiguous and tends to be subject to complicated and manipulable sliding scales. The precise theory of the status of those exceptional realms also varies a good deal, generation by generation, and depends on current intellectual fashions. For instance, many would say that their religious beliefs have a “symbolic” rather than literal significance, and hence to subject them to the same criteria as ordinary affirmations is a logical solecism. After World War II, when existentialism was much in vogue, it was often said that faith was related to commitment, not to evidence and reasoning. Recently, identity has been much in evidence. Details vary a great deal: what is shared, and essential, is that literal, straightforward interpretation of religious assertions — as meaning what they evidently seem to mean and what they had always been taken as meaning by ordinary people in the past — is out and is held to be a bit uncivilized and
coarse; and that people known as fundamentalists, who are defined precisely as people guilty of such an attitude, are not altogether fit for polite society.

If this is what fundamentalism means, then in a sense, there are few if any fundamentalists within Islam. Those who believe in a literal sense are not a set of socially marginal and educationally underprivileged members of society, not fully part of the overall cultural consensus and only incorporated in the moral community by courtesy and with a touch of embarrassment. Within Islam, firm and literal belief has none of these condescending or perjorative associations and is not held to sin against the cultural-intellectual norm. It calls for no special explanation or apology or justification. On the contrary, it is the norm. It is those who deviate from it who are exceptional and are obligated to camouflage themselves.

There is a further and very important difference. Though fundamentalism—or to distinguish it from its Western variant, shall we call it rigorism?—does indeed contrast with modern secularism and disbelief, this is not its main and so to speak politically operational contrast. Its most conspicuous antithesis is not rational disbelief but, on the contrary, excessive folk belief, the presence of ideas, practices, and rituals which are unauthorized accretions to the properly defined corpus of the faith. The great reformation which has overtaken the Muslim world in the last hundred years or so and which the West has noticed barely, if at all, has been the displacement of folk superstition, particularly the previously widespread practice of saint worship, by a more “proper,” scholarly, not to say scholastic, puritanical, scripturalist version of the faith. The high culture which had ever coexisted with a folk low culture, but had never been able to dominate it properly, has at last achieved a victory, thanks to modern conditions.

Muslim society had always known tension between, on the one hand, the segmentary participatory communities which pervaded
its extensive rural periphery and which were safe in the desert and mountain recesses from the encroachments of the city-based state and, on the other hand, the Umma, the city-centered book-and-law-implementing society, expressing the ideals of the high culture. It tended to oscillate between the two, pushed toward a more rigorous observance of the Umma by periodic outbursts of revivalist zeal and then sliding back again. Only in the modern world does this pendulum eventually become unhinged and the oscillation cease: the entire society at long last becomes committed to the Umma. Outsiders describe this as the victory of the fundamentalists, though for reasons indicated, the term is liable to be misleading.

Can this phenomenon be properly explained? If Muslim society in the past oscillated directly between segmentary communities and an Umma, it failed to engender anything much by way of civil society in the interstices between the two. Its urban world, as the greatest sociologist of Islam, Ibn Khaldun, insisted so much, was politically emasculated. But how does this baseline lead, under modern conditions, to the situation which rather surprises and pains the West —weak civil society, combined with the pervasiveness of “fundamentalism” or rigorism?

There are one or two partially overlapping explanations. Whether they are sufficient or satisfactory I do not know, but they are the best I can offer. Consider first of all a general theory of “underdevelopment.” The thing itself is simple: a society is underdeveloped if the technical, economic, military, and administrative equipment at its disposal is so markedly inferior to that which is in the hands of other societies that the resulting inequality leads to the domination, formal or informal, of that society by its better-endowed rivals.

In this situation, the members of the disadvantaged society tend to react in one of two ways: they can on the one hand become “Westernizers” or “modernizers,” determined to steal the secrets from those who own them and adapt them locally, so as to
correct the previous inequality. This would seem to be the logical way out of the predicament; it does, however, have the disadvantage of implying, or indeed overtly expressing, contempt for the local culture and its traditions. Many find the adoption of a philosophy which involves such contempt for their own ancestors emotionally unacceptable. This revulsion then impels some of them toward the alternative solution: they become romantics or populists. Such an option involves an emphatic reaffirmation of the values of the local community, and a repudiation of the pursuit of alien ways of life.

The tensions inherent in this dilemma can be discerned, under various terminologies, in a number of places and at various times. No doubt it found its truly classical expression in nineteenth-century Russia and its literature. Some “developing” societies suffered from this tension more and some less, but to some extent or another, the problem was very widespread. The really striking exception to it, however, is the world of Islam.

Islam was already endowed with, and habituated to, a tension of this general kind — the tension between the morally demanding and rather individualist ethos of its Great Tradition and the morally laxer, more communitarian Little Tradition, with its addiction to meditation, cult of personality, and communal ritual. So, when the Western intrusion, military and economic, made self-reform mandatory, a model was already available for self-improvement. There was no need to go to the outside world in order to borrow one. The pure model, offered by the local Great Tradition, was genuinely indigenous, in the sense that it had “always” been there (or at any rate, it had been part of the local scene long enough to seem to have been there from the very beginning).

And not only was the existing, readily available high-culture model genuinely indigenous (thus dispensing the enthusiasts of rigorous reform from behaving as worshipers of the alien and spurners of the local); it also had other merits. In a variety of
ways, it seems well suited to the requirements of modern society. Not, perhaps, the idealized version of modern society as anticipated and predicted by the Enlightenment, but rather of the more sober, ambivalence-provoking picture, warts and all, found, say, in the sociology of Max Weber. The picture we find there is that of a society short on magic, endowed with a formal ethic of rule observance, with a rather enchantment-free world and with a distant, orderly, and exclusive deity related to its faithful in an egalitarian manner, through Holy Writ rather than miracle, ecstatic ritual, or prestation. Its representatives on earth are a corps of sober scholars and not so much a hierarchy of ritual specialists. Weberian sociology saw this kind of ethos and organization both as helping to engender the modern world and as consonant with its requirements when such a world became established. It possesses a kind of dignity and acceptability by modern standards, which is more than can be claimed for the practices of the der- vishes and marabouts.

Islam certainly did not engender the modern world; probably this was precluded by its political structure. The commercial bourgeoisie was far too frightened of the rapacious segmentary communities, not at all distant from the city walls, to allow itself to defy its only protector, the central power. So commerce-based autonomous civil society never really emerged. But if, for these or other reasons, Islam never engendered modernity, when in the end modernity was forcibly imposed on it, it found itself in possession of a high culture astonishingly congruent with the new requirements. That high culture could then take over and define the society as a whole, rather than merely defining a respected elite and being honored more in the breach than in the observance.

The way Muslims present the recent revival to themselves tends to be in terms of a return to the pristine purity of the Prophet and his Companions. This may be a bit of an illusion: I doubt whether there is any genuine resemblance between current revivalists and the real contemporaries and supporters of Moham-
med. But what is true is that they are reviving, or vigorously reaffirming and diffusing, a religious style which was genuinely present for a long time among the urban scholarly elite, whether or not it had been present from the start. So Islam escapes the painful dilemma, the choice between a self-spurning Westernization and an implausible, not altogether practicable populist idealization of a folk tradition. They can affirm a high culture, which is both “high” and compatible with modern conditions and yet genuinely indigenous. It had been a minority style in the past (albeit that of a minority which set the tone for the entire society, even if it was not fully emulated); now it has become the effective, pervasive, folk-including religious style of the society as a whole. Its lower strata are happy to use it as a token of their own ascension.

Not only is it, with its low load of magic, its puritan scripturalism, its unitarianism and individualism, well consonant with the ethos of industrial society, as analyzed by Weber; it also possesses a fittingness for the modern world akin to that possessed by nationalism. In the West, the Reformation, with its stress on the use of the vernacular and its diffusion of literacy, preceded nationalism and prepared the ground for it; in Islam, the local reformation (the revivalist, unitarian, antimeditation movement) can hardly be disentangled from nationalism, and it appeared on the scene at the same time. The essence of nationalism is to be found in the new role of culture in industrial or industrializing society: a literacy-sustained, educationally transmitted high culture, previously a minority elite accomplishment and privilege, becomes, under modern conditions, the effective medium of the life of an entire society. Men no longer identify with their position in an elaborate social structure (which is no longer stable enough to permit this) but, rather, with their culture: one they had acquired through schooling and not simply through living. This high culture alone enables them to take part in the work and play of their society. But Islam performs the same function: it
provides its adherents with a formal idiom, through which they can communicate with the anonymous mass of their fellow citizens, in a predominantly urbanized and mobile society. It is a high culture which provides atomized members of a mass society to communicate in and identify with their social environment.

In this way, the newly pervasive and now more effectively dominant high-culture style of Islam also satisfies a new need of the uprooted populations in recently centralized societies. It confirms the ascension of erstwhile peasants and/or tribesmen into urban society: they leave behind the shrine and the periodical, the more or less ecstatic and questionably orthodox ritual and festivity, and attend instead the sober prayer which incorporates all the faithful, as individual believers, rather than as clan units. Furthermore, it defines the faithful as against the colonial Other; new nations, such as the Algerians, are simply the summation of all Muslims within a given territory, defined against non-Muslims. They had never been a “nation” previously. And third, the newly generalized high Islam also defines the masses against their own possibly over-Westernized and religiously lukewarm political and technocratic elites. In the case of Iran, this confrontation turned out to possess an astonishing explosive revolutionary potential.

This is the best explanation I can offer to the question why, in an otherwise more or less secularizing world, Islam has moved toward what others see as fundamentalism, and why, at any rate so far, it shows not the slightest sign of losing its ardor. It has moved straight from the segmentary community to the Umma. It had always been divided between the two (rather than having moved, like the ancient Mediterranean world according to Fustel, from one to the other); but now, at long last, instead of continuing to oscillate, as Hume had thought it would forever, it has moved definitively, and with apparent irreversibility, to the Umma. And what does that signify for its political life?

The Umma is a charismatic community of equal believers under God, governing itself by God’s law as revealed in Holy
Writ, and by the corpus of deductions or applications extracted from it by the scholars. Traditional Muslim political theology varies somewhat in the relative role it ascribes, within this community, to the scholars qualified by their learning to tell others what the law actually is, and to the members of the House of the Prophet, qualified by birth to assume leadership. On the far right of this political spectrum, so to speak, we find the Shi’ites attributing political authority to personnel of the House of the Prophet qualified for this position not only by their ancestry but also by their martyrdom and their literal divinity. The martyrdom-orientation of Shi’ism gave it an astonishing potential for revolutionary mobilization, dramatically demonstrated in the course of the Iranian revolution: the fact that Shi’ite scholars are biographers of martyrs as well as doctors of law makes it far easier for them to communicate with the masses. Moreover, the martyrdom-model is inherently rousing. People can listen to stories of martyrdom more easily than to legal hairsplitting.

But although Khomeini used these elements to the full in the course of bringing the revolution to its successful conclusion, the toppling of the previous regime, he rather pensioned off these elements when he constructed the ideology and the political theory of the new theocracy. Government was to be a matter of the impartial and unwavering, incorruptible application of the law, little affected—if indeed affected at all—by whether the sacred and indeed divine Hidden Imam was present or not. Sacred Personality became politically irrelevant. In effect, Khomeini Sunnified Shi’ism, thus providing a further measure of confirmation for the idea that it was the Weberian, sober-bourgeois elements in Islam (particularly prominent in Sunnism) which made it so attractive and acceptable in our world, and which made Islam so secularization-resistant.

So how does the new unitarian, puritan, scripturalist Umma actually work, politically speaking? Is it really a government not of men but of lawyers? Has an ethic of rule observance really replaced, even in the political arena, an ethic of loyalty and patron-
age? Is this a genuinely atomized charismatic society of equal believers, governed by divine law, interpreted by scholars? If the divine patronage networks of the marabouts and the dervishes have disappeared — or at any rate, have become much less prominent — in the religious sphere, can one say the same of the political arena and declare it relatively free of patronage networks?

The question answers itself: any declaration to the effect that patronage politics do not occur in Muslim countries can only arouse a smile. Muslim politics provide the very paradigm of patronage systems. How does this indisputable fact square with an explanation of the modern appeal of Islam, which invokes its symmetrical, egalitarian, puritanical, individualist features? In fact these two characterizations are compatible. How has Islam moved from relatively egalitarian tribes and *in egalitarian saintly networks* and *an egalitarian religion*?

The community has to be governed somehow. It cannot run on law alone. Men do not simply obey disembodied abstractions like the law, even if they revere it. There has to be some kind of political apparatus, a network of men linked by loyalty, a pattern of cohesion and obedience, which enforces order. The only thing with which the political tradition is familiar, apart from the ideal of law-implementing Umma, is networks of personal loyalty. Under modern conditions, the nucleus of such a network is no longer the pastoral tribe: pastoralists are no longer militarily significant. The nearest thing to it is the network forged from a mixture of kin and regional and mutual-obligation loyalties. These networks, and not the formal political structures copied out of books or from foreign models, constitute the genuine political reality in this world.

Is this incompatible with the legalism and moralism of the Umma, and does it show the latter to be a mere facade, a piece of hypocrisy? I do not think so. The two elements complement each other, just as, in the old days, tribalism proper and the Umma complemented each other. Neither government nor tribes could
defy, with impunity, the requirements of the abstract ideal. To do so brazenly was to risk provoking a coalition of others, more respectful of the faith, or at any rate only too willing to claim to be such so as to excuse and justify aggression against the sinning brethren. Similarly, the patronage networks operate within limits set by the respected forms of faith.

The current pluralism and rivalry of networks have their roots in erstwhile segmentary communities and seem to retain crucial features connected with these origins. The competing units seek power but are not linked to persisting economic specialisms, and there is no deep respect for the formal institutions. Politics has a “winner take all” quality, and political power basically trumps all else as a source of wealth. So the society is still strung out between an all-embracing Umma, the ultimate carrier of legitimacy, defined in terms of a shared and equally accessible revelation, and on the other hand power associations which rule de facto but do not fully avow themselves. The society as a whole identifies with the Umma, and at the same time all in all resigns itself to the networks or mafias. It has a very strong commitment to the faith which defines it, and little, if any, powerful longing for civil society, for a set of religiously neutral institutions counterbalancing the state. In the struggle of the networks, violation of the faith is a weighty but not always decisive consideration which can be invoked against any one of them. To sum up, there is a plethora of faith and little craving for civil society.

If this is an accurate general characterization of the southeasterly Muslim neighbor of Atlantic civilization, it makes a neat contrast to the Marxist eastern one: there, we witness a virtually total erosion of faith, combined with a strong, in many cases passionate, yearning for civil society. In fact, the present vogue of the term originates precisely in the politico-intellectual life and turbulence of that region.

The claim central to Marxist theory was that civil society is a fraud. The apparent plurality of nonstate institutions adds up to
a system systematically slanted in favor of one category ("class") of people, defined in terms of their relationship to the available means of production. The apparent neutrality of the superimposed order-keeping institutions—in other words, the state—is quite spurious. This coercive machinery of the state simply ensured the safety of those institutions which were necessary for the perpetuation, and incidentally the camouflage, of the conditions which maintained the unequal and slanted control of resources. Both the plural institutions and their coercive cover really had no function, no raison d’être, other than the services they performed for this class structure. Their abolition, under favorable conditions of advanced productive equipment, would lead to no disaster whatever—contrary to the ideological defense which had been put out on its behalf—but would, on the contrary, be beneficial. Mankind could eventually manage—and manage much better—without both civil society and the state. Both were frauds, obscuring a squalid reality. Once that regrettable situation had been corrected, or rather, had corrected itself through the working out of deep processes whose laws were laid bare by Marxism itself, neither civil society nor the state would be required. Both would be pensioned off. The state, as a system of coercion, might at most be required as a temporary measure during the transitional period.

What happened in the Soviet Union between 1917 and 1989 is of course one of the great experiments in human history. The attempt to implement Marxism is the first secular effort at a theocracy, or to put it in a nonparadoxical manner, at ideocracy, as Raymond Aron used to call it. The thinkers of the Enlightenment had their own secular Heavenly City, which failed in the aftermath of the French Revolution. The French Revolution could of course be counted as the first such attempt, but it lacked a properly elaborated theory of history and society. It was precisely its failure which engendered such theories, and among them, Marxism became, for better or for worse, by far the most influential. It was a curious blend of brutal realism, bourgeois fantasy, and human
utopianism. The bourgeois fantasy lay in its doctrine that work was the very essence of man, that all institutions constraining or thwarting this deep need were inherently pathological, that productive institutions and processes were crucial in history (all else being but froth), and that this domination of historic development by the productive process would in due course lead to total human fulfillment through free, spontaneous, unconstrained labor. It would then need no state to enforce order and no civil society to check the state.

All this stress on fulfillment through free work is a remarkable projection of middle-class values onto the very essence, the Gattungs-Wesen, of man. Other classes often like to indulge their laziness and the pursuit of pleasure, or their vanity. It is the middle class which finds the escape from the tragic human condition in work. It is they who labor, not for reward, but out of love of labor for its own sake. It is they who need no sanctions to make them pursue their vocation. Pascal thought that men pursued vanities, divertissement, so as to escape existential anguish; Weber showed that one group of men at any rate, harassed by a more than usual dose of such anxiety, found an even more effective escape in hard, disinterested work and in plowing back their profits. They thereby inadvertently brought about the first economic miracle and the modern world—something which could never have been achieved had it been directly intended. In a domination-prone world, economic rationality is not rational: those who work hard see themselves deprived of the fruits of their labor only by those in power. It could be brought about only by cunning and reason, as an unintended consequence of religious anguish. Those who sought wealth were not to be granted it; those who merely sought to escape despair had wealth bestowed upon them. But Marxism credits this distinctively bourgeois trait to the human soul as such, not to some men under the impulsion of a special torment: work is, it claims, our genuine essence and our time fulfillment.
The utopianism inherent in Marxism is in part connected with this generalization of the Western bourgeois vision of man and in part no doubt has other sources, linked to Enlightenment optimism. The consequence of the messianic expectation of an ultimate social order which will require no coercive maintenance is of course that Marxism possesses no theory of either civil society or of the state. Neither is required. It affirms that in the end both will be redundant, and in the meantime both are fraudulent. In consequence, of course, Marxists simply possess no language in which to express their central political problem: their theory precluded the very existence of the problem and eliminated any tools for handling it. As long as political circumstance constrained them to remain within Marxist language, they simply could not even discuss their main problem: that constraint, however, seems now at long last to have lapsed.

The history of the Soviet Union since the Revolution, leaving aside the initial period of transition, falls into two main periods — Terror and Squalor. The two are separated by the first liberalization and followed by the second, whose fate is as yet undecided. The interesting thing about the period of total terror was that it was also a period of faith. It was not merely that terror enforced faith, so much so that men did not even dare admit their doubts to themselves; it was also the case, in a curious kind of way, that terror confirmed the validity of the faith. A terror so total, so pervasive and unprecedented, could only be the herald of some complete transformation of society, indeed of the human condition itself. Without necessarily believing individual propositions of Marxism or specific claims of the authorities, many of those involved in the system accepted its basic vision in a general kind of way, even if they detested the system. Such horror could only herald some Second Coming!

Both inside and outside the Communist world, Marxism succeeded in securing a near monopoly of the critique of liberal theory and practice. When liberal society did particularly badly
in the 1930s — acute economic crisis which confirmed the Marxist prognoses, and the unmasking of the true moral nature of bourgeois society by the brutal candors of fascism and nazism—Marxism correspondingly benefited in prestige. Like other faiths, Marxism operated in a circle of ideas, which contained simple but powerful devices for counteracting the effect of any hostile ideas and evidence. Did dreadful and arbitrary oppression take place in the Soviet Union? The enemies of socialism, the “capitalist press,” would of course say so: but the interest of the enemies of socialism in denigrating socialism was so blatant that the evidence they invented so shamelessly could safely and justly be disregarded.

There was also a second line of defense: even if some of that evidence were correct, it would be utterly naive to suppose that a ruthless war, destined to end only in the elimination of one of the two rival systems, and in which no real compromise was possible, could be conducted in terms of some neutral and supposedly higher moral principles. There was no principle, no morality, other than the overriding need for the victory of that alienated human class which was due to inaugurate a new social order within which, at long last, humanity would fulfill itself. To put that victory in peril, or even to delay it, in the name of some inevitably spurious principle invested by bourgeois society in its own interests, in order to befuddle and confuse those whom it oppressed—that surely would be the greatest treason! There can be no such principle: nothing can trump the imperative of human liberation. Those who committed such treason, or even those who merely committed it in their hearts, had to be dealt with ruthlessly and could expect no mercy. And they received none,

Self-maintaining circles of ideas of this kind are astonishingly effective and robust. The fact that some segments of the circle carry an amazing load of blatant falsehood fails to subvert the circle as a whole, always provided that two conditions are satisfied: that the circle holds firm internally and does not itself deny any of its own elements, and that it also contains important seg-
ments which record great insights and have a genuine appeal and which thus provide deep psychic satisfaction for the adherents. Marxism, like other belief systems one can think of, amply satisfied these conditions. Its critique of the waste, inequality, unnecessary poverty, and frequent fraudulence of capitalist society, especially perhaps in the 1930s, struck home. As long as those occupying important positions within the circle do indeed stand firm, the circle has little to fear. A climate had been created in which this was one of the great modern belief systems, with a powerful hold on the loyalty of men, and social thought was lived largely in terms of what one of the adherents of the system called “The Great Contest.” We had become habituated to this great confrontation, to the fact that there were two rival interpretations of the nature, destiny, and proper comportment of industrial society, and that, at least logically speaking, neither of the two rival visions would ever be compelled to capitulate. Each contained devices for discounting the arguments adduced by its opponent.

Western society has had some extensive practice in handling this kind of confrontation. This was by no means the first time that this situation had arisen. The wars of religion had had a similar character; so had the confrontation between the Enlightenment and traditional religion. There is a certain formal resemblance between the latter conflict and the one between liberalism and Marxism. In each case, the situation is not fully symmetrical. On the liberal as on the secularist side, there is not a fully developed, orchestrated, codified faith, with an answer to everything, and with its own clerisy and supporting institutions: there is only a negative consensus, a denial of dogmatism and of the claim to unique possession of truth. On the other side, by contrast, there is a fully developed faith with all its institutional underpinning. Which side has the advantage? The secularists and the liberals have the benefit of offering fewer targets for refutation, giving fewer hostages to cognitive fortune; but they have the disadvantage of being less comforting, less reassuring, of possessing less by
way of mutual confirmation and support between idea and institutions, and fewer agreed, ever-ready devices for discounting and devaluing the skeptic and the critic. As ideological pep pills, they are less potent.

Marxism, though not the first secular counterfaith, is the first such system to have been formally adopted by large, populous, and important societies. It is the first secularized faith to have been effectively implemented in the real world on a large and protracted scale. The resulting experiment does not necessarily tell us what the fate of any secular religion would be; nevertheless, it provides the best evidence we possess, so far, of the social and historical viability of overtly and fully secular religion. We shall have to read its entrails for our understanding of this option.

What in fact happened to the Marxist Circle? Twice it was crucially breached from the inside, the only kind of breach to which these circles are really vulnerable: first by Khrushchev, and the second time by Gorbachev. The first time round, the wound was not all that deep: what was conceded were certain factual charges against Stalin and his period, and these were declared aberrations from or distortions of true Marxism. The faith itself, its central values and intuitions and doctrines, were not disavowed or even subjected to serious scrutiny. Conviction remained strong and vivid, and Khrushchev did indeed believe that communism would eventually prevail in the Great Contest. The political turbulence provoked within the system was, however, disturbing enough for its leadership to ensure that Khrushchev was eventually—though peacefully—toppled, and liberalization went into reverse, There followed the period now officially designated as Stagnation, during which Soviet citizens and the bureaucracy which ruled them became increasingly more comfortable (though not nearly comfortable enough when comparisons came to be made, not with the past, but with the contemporary West); it also became more cynical, more corrupt, and, from the viewpoint of the messianic soteriology of Marxism, more routinized, disabused, doubly secularized,
so to speak. This cynicism could not be expressed in public, so those who consciously articulated it to themselves had to indulge in this like a solitary vice.

Then, under the impact of relative (though not yet absolute) economic failure, came the second, Gorbachevian liberalization. It took off the lid, and suddenly it became plain that no one subscribed to the faith anymore. For instance, at the Institute of Philosophy of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, they still have, in accordance with old custom, red slogans on banners for the embellishment of the place and the edification of the visitor. In the entrance hall, you can read, in very large letters, a hadith of Lenin, to the effect that Marxist doctrine is all-powerful because it is true. I suggest that, by way of experiment, you try out this phrase on any Moscow intellectual: it is impossible for him to hear it without smiling. The idea that Marxist doctrine is either all-powerful or all true is simply comic, above all for those who had long lived in an atmosphere in which external respect for such a nation was obligatory.

What is Perestroika about? It was of course provoked by the relative economic failure of the Soviet Union and by the clear prospect of more of the same to come. Had the USSR been reasonably successful economically, it is exceedingly unlikely that any leader would have taken on the enormous risks, predictable and only too conspicuous now, which are inherent in the overall liberalization and democratization of the country. The pressure from below for reform was far from irresistible, and all the initial reforms, as Moscow liberals are willing to concede, were gifts from above, not something wrested by the beneficiaries. Popular pressure became manifest and powerful only when it became obvious that it would be indulged without lethal or much other serious peril. Likewise, eventual economic success or failure can be expected to be crucial for the fate of Perestroika itself. While not wishing in any way to deny all this, I would nevertheless be reluctant to accept an economic interpretation of Perestroika. This transformation means many things to many men, but it is not ex-
clusively, or even predominantly, about the economy. *It is about the rebirth of Civil Society.*

Civil society had indeed been destroyed during the Stalinist terror, and certainly not revived during the Brezhnevite stagnation. It is perhaps for further historical research to determine just how totally it was destroyed, and to what extent talk about the atomization of society in that period is an exaggeration. No doubt it was not destroyed as completely as it was by Pol Pot. But very little remained by way of institutions other than the single central state-party hierarchy and its appendages. Under Stalin, this monolithic social order, more than Caesaro-Papist — the single hierarchy embraced production as well as the maintenance of order and the servicing of faith — was also an Umma. It was pervaded by faith, and took faith with utmost seriousness.

Under Brezhnev, it quietly ceased to be an Umma: it had entered this period still endowed with faith and left it wholly devoid of it. Theoretically, it now faces three alternatives: it could return to both authoritarian centralism and to faith and become an Umma once again, having found that liberalization leads only to ethnic conflict, not to any hoped-for economic amelioration; it could continue in its faithless way while retaining a centralized authoritarian polity — which would amount to a kind of general criminalization of society, of domination without legitimation, a kind of nuclear Haiti; or it could continue in its faithless way but allow, encourage, or induce the withering away, partial or total, of the centralized political structure which had been engendered by the faith — in the days when that faith was still taken seriously. The third option can also be put more simply: it can reacquire civil society — in other words, a set of institutions strong enough to check the state, yet not, so to speak, mandatory enough from the viewpoint of individuals to constitute an alternative form of oppression. So civil society is an alternative to the return to an Umma and to a slide into criminalization. In a sense there are of course other options still: it could return to an Umma, but one
based on a different faith — for instance, on some blend of nationalism and either traditionalism or authoritarianism or both.

While no one would wish to spurn economic improvement, either as desirable in itself or as an indispensable precondition of the success of the enterprise as a whole, nevertheless it is this striving for the civil-society option which is at the heart of it all. By what paths did Russia arrive at this predicament? —without faith, without much in the way of civil society, with an overblown but incompetent state machinery running a sluggish economy. . . .

One can draw up a checklist of the factors or preconditions which may have contributed to this situation.

There is, first of all, a certain very distinctive feature of the system of ideas on which this ideocracy was based: the fact that it was indeed more than Caesaro-Papist, that it fused not only the political and ideological functions but the economic one as well. Strictly speaking, the system of ideas did not contain a warrant for jointly centralizing polity and faith, insofar as the state was meant to wither away and the faith to be sustained by its own luminous and manifest truth, without benefit of coercion; but given the conspicuous fact that none of this happened and that a unique political and ideocratic apparatus did emerge, it inevitably also fused state and church with the centralized economic management.

A basic political centralization is inherent, it would seem, in advanced industrial society: order must be maintained, and it is difficult to imagine industrial production being maintained under conditions of genuine pluralism of mutually independent coercive agencies. In exceptional circumstances, something like this does happen — when multiple criminal and/or political mafias govern a large city (Belfast, Algiers during the final stages of the French presence, or highly criminalized sections of inner cities in one or two advanced industrial nations) ; but in general, industrial society presupposes that productive citizens can go to and from work without either protecting themselves or needing to duck while rival mafias or police forces shoot it out. It is assumed, in contrast
to segmentary society where the unit of habitation and production is also the unit of self-government, of ritual and defense, that citizens can rely for their protection on a specialized and unique agency or group of agencies. Citizens know whom to obey and do not need to form or choose alliances so as to ensure their own security. The job of keeping peace is performed, and it is clear precisely who does it. It is not a civic activity, but a precondition of other, legitimate civic activities.

If this argument is correct, then modern society cannot find its pluralism in the political or governmental sphere (if by that we mean the order-enforcing agencies). The peacekeeping institution may perhaps take its orders from plural and severally independent bodies (say assemblies, institutions, pressure groups), but it cannot itself consist of genuinely independent bodies, liable to use their instruments of violence on each other. That is the way of segmentary or feudal societies but is simply not feasible in a society with a sophisticated and growing technology, an enormously complex division of labor, and mutual interdependence of highly developed specialisms. Segmentary and similar politically plural societies cannot give us what we want — namely, civil society. All this being so, such pluralism as we need must have its base in either the economic or the ideological sphere, or both. It is precisely because the modern state does indeed have the monopoly of legitimate coercion (and, in fact, the monopoly of coercion sans phrases when it is not undermined and is functioning properly), that pluralism, or the breaching of monopoly, must occur in one of the other two realms: and, when full-blooded and passionately embraced Marxism prevails, it is not allowed to emerge in them. Nor does it arise anywhere else either. Full-blooded Marxism monopolizes faith and the state while claiming that the latter is to be dismantled and that the former monopoly arises spontaneously. It also, thanks to its central tenet of the denial of private ownership of the means of production, monopolizes the economy. It thereby makes civil society impossible.
Marxism does not, either with malice aforethought or in so many words, oppose intellectual freedom. On the contrary, it is impeccably high-minded and highbrow. One of Lenin’s hadith, which one can still read on the surviving banners in the Soviet Union, reminds the faithful that one cannot be a good Communist unless one has mastered the cultural wealth of humanity. The comrades are expected to have read the best books and to know how to quote from them (though clearly this requirement lapsed in the days of the sleazy Brezhnevite bureaucracy). No boss or philistines in the Party! In fact, some thinkers still incapable of liberating themselves from a residual hold of Marxism retain their attachment to it precisely because it seems to aim at making this world one fit for intellectuals (and perhaps for no one else) to live in. We’ll have not merely fulfillment but a better class of fulfillment, if you know what I mean. So it wasn’t on purpose that Marxism imposed an appalling, stifling straitjacket on intellectual life, when it was in a position to do so. This was a consequence of the logic of its ideas when implemented, not an overt part of the ideas themselves.

The reason it happened was double: partly it was a corollary of its messianism: if Marxism is a unique revelation which is bringing about the liberation of mankind and is alone capable of achieving that liberation, then rival views, denying it that status (automatically, simply by virtue of being rivals), can only be the agents, conscious or other, of those with a vested interest in opposing and delaying that liberation. If rival political associations are not to be tolerated, then the same must hold of ideas which would encourage their establishment. Siege mentality—a single, inherently unique force for good was locked in a deadly and terminal conflict with inescapably evil enemies—together with the dreadfully overdeveloped tendency toward circular thinking, in practice led Marxism to impose intellectual monopoly and Gleichschaltung. It is of course true that many religious systems (notably the “higher,” doctrinally codified and developed ones) also can-
not logically tolerate coexistence with rivals: the very existence of a rival is a kind of blasphemy, a denial of that messianic claim which lies at the center of the religion. In practice, however, some at least of these theoretically exclusive and monopolistic faiths have of late learned how to accommodate themselves, with courtesy and even with cordiality, to a religious pluralism.

At least as important, perhaps more important, is the overwhelming tendency toward economic monopoly and centralism. There are two tendencies, in theory, which bear on this point in Marxism and socialism. On the one hand, there is an instinctive warm reaction to “planning” (which once upon a time used to be a word with a strong positive charge), due to the deeply and pervasively held conviction that both the injustices and the inefficiencies of capitalism were consequences of its free-for-all, chaotic lack of direction. The doctrinal leanings in this direction were of course reinforced by a political pressure—in times of real or potential civil war, one does not lightly release important resources, which might then fall into enemy hands. The other tendency within socialist thought, however, is the favoring or expectation of some kind of spontaneous, unenforced harmony between and within productive units. This trend received further stimulus when central planning failed to have either the economic or the political beneficial consequences which had initially been expected. It led to all those experiments with “workers’ self-management” and decentralization, tried out most persistently by the first opters-out from Stalinism, the Yugoslavs. These experiments were not crowned by any success either, and in general one can say that they find themselves incapable of avoiding a certain dilemma: either the decentralized units are genuinely independent and control their own resources, and then we have capitalism under a new name, with great inequalities of wealth and power between such units; or in the end they are not genuinely independent (which was what happened in practice), in which case
we merely have a cosmetically modified (in the worst cases, only terminologically modified) socialist centralism.

In brief, a complex, technically sophisticated, and interdependent economy has to be run in some way: either independent units, genuinely in control of their own resources and their own profits, meet freely under the law in a market, or there is central direction. What appears to be impossible is to have economic liberty and pluralism and the abolition of private property. The property and resources taken away from private or separate hands, do not disappear into thin air; someone has to control them and decide their fate and deployment, and in a politically and ideologically centralized society, one which believes itself (at certain times, with justification) to be in a state of siege, naturally this dislocated control devolves to the unique power center. This can happen because there is no one else to whom it could devolve, or because there is a positive belief in central planning, or for both these reasons.

The real historic development of socialist societies has made the consequences of this only too conspicuous. If, during the 1930s, when an economic crisis and its political effects seemed to illustrate and confirm all the prognostications of Marxism, “planning,” whatever it might be, seemed automatically to mean something good, then by the end of the 1980s, the “administrative command” system came to be seen as the root of all evil, and “the market,” or market levers, as infallible holy water, which would purge us of all economic sin. What happens under the single-hierarchy command-admin system is that, all in all, those responsible for various units and segments of the economy are largely free of the need to be successful economically but depend for their position, for retaining it or for advancing further along the ladder, on their political alignments, alliances, and intrigues within that hierarchy. Insofar as they also need to acquit themselves as actual producers, in the absence of a market they are once again dependent on their informal network connections. So, one way or
another, political connections, reciprocal services, are what really count, rather than technical efficiency. In practice, serious socialism has meant the command-admin system, and that system has proved to be highly inefficient.

So the faith—partly because it was indeed a messianic, soteriological faith, and partly because of its specific doctrinal content, its actual views of the role of the economy in human society and history—imposed a triple centralism—political, ideological, and economic—on society, a kind of Caesaro-Papism-Mammonism; and at the same time, the faith itself evaporated. It attained monopoly and lost its own soul: it ended as the monopoly of a nonfaith. The faith spawned monopolistic institutions, which did not work and which lost the very conviction which had engendered them. So we ask once again: just why did faith evaporate, and evaporate so totally?

The answer to this question is less than clear, but the temptation to speculate about it is irresistible. Why is the first secular faith to become a world religion endowed with such a tremendously rapid rate of obsolescence? Why is it that, little more than half a century after its conquest of a major society, there is no one within that society who still takes it seriously, and there are very few even willing to honor it with the compliment of rational opposition? I hesitate to suggest that this has much to do with the fact that this faith has proved itself to be factually false: empirical falsification has failed to bother most other belief systems. Is it that an overtly secular doctrine is after all more vulnerable to empirical refutation? That traditional religions in the literal sense, whose doctrinal center of gravity is in some other world, are consequently less vulnerable to empirical fact than a vision which claims that it is only about this world, even if it also possesses a special revealed privileged access to the truth about this world? Is it that a creed claiming to be the expression of a coming advanced production stage cannot survive the humiliating demonstration of its economic ineptitude? Is it the excessively collective
nature of the salvation offered by this religion, which offers no hope, no consolation to the individual sufferer, whose acute misery may make him or her unwilling to find solace in things which will only come to pass long after he or she is here no longer? When prophecy fails, the prophets generally find an escape clause, and their faithful, with a deep psychic investment in their commitment, are generally happy to allow them to use it. Why has Marxism, within Marxist societies, not similarly benefited from those well-known, once widely practiced and effective mechanisms? The answer is not clear; but there seems to be no doubt about the facts of the case, which give rise to the question. This secularism has been secularized, this charisma has been routinized to the point of invisibility.

Perhaps the humdrum reason for the rapid obsolescence of the secular faith can be highlighted if we compare it with the traditional faith which is so marvelously resistant to both routinization and secularist erosion, namely Islam. Muslim ideocracy does not attempt to unify and centralize economic life; it regulates it in some measure and, notoriously, some of its requirements are not easy to square with the normal working of the modern financial world; but all in all, it takes the economic institutions of its time for granted and does not aspire to transform them radically. Its quest for justice or the elimination of corruption on earth is not pervaded by any modern sociological sense of the relativity of economic institutions and the possibility of their radical reorganization. The Muslim state may on occasion grab a large part of the economy—the control of the economic commanding heights comes to it quite naturally; it was indeed ever inclined to have a keen eye for commanding heights and a sense of the importance of controlling them and not endowing wealth to create rival power bases; it has all the Leninist instincts—but it does not do so in the name of an absolute principle, one which it is necessary to follow out to its full logical consequences. It may have a sense of justice and the obligation to enforce it, to monopolize power so as to enforce good and suppress evil, but it does not have that special
sense of justice requiring a total economic reorganization. It is concerned with a justice only in the context of existing economic custom.

Perhaps it is this difference rather than the fact that one of the two faiths concerns itself with the transcendent, while the other, at any rate formally, severely restricts its pronouncements to this world, which accounts for the success of one and the failure of the other. Marxism may be overexposed to reality not so much because it is, formally, so very immanentist and antitranscendentalist, but because its aspirations for reform in this world are so very overextended. Their failure invalidates the system, and they invite failure; they failed by attempting and promising too much. Marx notoriously wanted to change the world rather than merely understand it, and the changes he commended turned out to constitute excessively exposed hostages to fortune.

On a very loose interpretation, one of the central intuitions of Marxism does, however, remain valid: there is indeed a connection (though not, probably, a one-to-one connection) between the technological level of the forces of production and social organization. But the second and more specific proposition, also crucial to Marxism, which connects this general insight with a specific claim, has been falsified in a humiliatingly public and conspicuous way: the idea that socialism is the institutional accompaniment of a superior technology, of a higher state in the development of the forces of production, now appears absurd. The major and tenable Marxist premise, in conjunction with the conspicuously falsified Marxist minor premise, has engendered the conclusion which is fated for Marxism.

Western capitalism has indeed been overtaken, but the overtaking was carried out by the Shintoists or Buddhists or Confucians, or whatever they are, of East Asia, and most emphatically not by the Marxists. Everyone knows this, and perhaps it is this refutation, felt where it hurts, which helps account for the dramatic and total erosion of Marxist faith. Possibly the failure of Marxism to provide rituals and solaces for individual tragedy,
alongside its collectivist eschatology also makes its contribution. In all this, Islam provides almost a mirror image for Marxism: in its ritual and other regulations of daily life, it does provide the individual with a handrail through life; but it imposes no obligation on authorities to transform the organizational principles of the economy and to demonstrate the ultimate cosmic validity of that transformation by a brilliant, or at the very least a superior, economic performance.

**Summary**

We return to an overall comparison of the two civilizations. Both have weak civil societies, meaning thereby a complex of institutions which are not the state but which can stand up to it and limit its power and at the same time do not themselves circumscribe the freedom of action of the individual. (In other words, these institutions must not, like those of segmentary society, be mandatory and demanding. Though powerful, they remain *optional* from the viewpoint of any one individual.) This is what we, or some of us, now see as an essential element of the good life.

So one can trace a certain line of development in the social thought of this century: time was, long, long ago, when men discussed the presence or absence of capitalism. Then came the discussion of industrialism, its preconditions, and whether or not it was convergent. That too is now a little dated: what really is of burning concern now are the preconditions of civil society.

The two civilizations we have compared both do rather badly by this criterion. But there the resemblance ends. One suffers from a total though not fully explained loss of faith; the other, from an astonishing plethora of it, to an extent which contradicts most sociological expectations concerning the fate of religion in the modern world. One of them seems relatively at ease with the absence of civil society: it is difficult to envisage, within it, a whole chain reaction of revolutions, all inspired by an ardent desire to establish civil society where it is lacking. The other, by contrast,
does seem possessed—at least among a significant proportion of its intellectual class, and probably among others too—by a strong sense of need for civil society.

How does one account for these differences? For one of them, I at any rate am strongly inclined to find a clue in what I called Hume’s contradiction. Hume’s main theory, found in his *Natural History of Religion*, assumes a world which is bounded by only two possibilities, segmentary society and the Umma. He condemns such a world to an eternal return, or rather oscillation, between these two forms. There is no room in such a world for a civil society resembling the very one in which Hume himself in fact lived. But Hume may well be right to this extent: there probably is no direct line of transition from a segmentary world to civil society. A world in which both segmentary organization and an ideocratic unitarian Umma coexist may indeed be condemned to an oscillation between the two or, if external factors intervene (the political centralization favoring new technology), be doomed to a blend of Umma and government by quasi-segmentary patronage networks. This is what in fact we find, at any rate so far, and the theory offers an explanation of why this should be so.

Just as there is no direct line from segmentation to civil society—but only to an absolutist Umma, so at the intellectual level, there may be no direct line from the tolerant ritual pluralism of the segmentary world (lacking in codified doctrine, rather than offering a plurality of it) to the tolerance of intellectual diversity, which is part of our notion of civil society. The path from the one to the other seems to have been complex: an intolerant Umma first teaches mankind respect for unique truth, for the Law of Excluded Middle, and only *then*, a particular political stalemate transmutes this into toleration combined with a doctrinal orientation and concern with truth. It seems to be important that the unitarian, serious ideocrats should be defeated but not crushed and that there should be a multistate system in which the more tolerant members of it benefit from the economic prowess of the puritans and hence
prevail internationally and thus also inspire further emulation. It was some theory of this kind that Hume was groping toward when he noticed that his more general theory, plausible though it was, did not cover the curious link between enthusiasm and liberty (and, as Adam Smith added, prosperity) in his own society.

What, then, went wrong in the society in which a weak civil society is combined with weak faith, to an extent that the ideocratic institutions survive (at this moment at any rate) without benefit of the faith which engendered them? One can only say that it seems to have been a misguided faith and that the balance of power within it seems to have been all wrong. What civil society seems to require, at any rate in its inception, is an individualist, not collectivist, eschatology, which does not interfere in economic practices too much, and which is defeated, but not too badly, making for a compromise accommodation between believers and worldly power. The theological egotism of the enthusiasts, which so appalled Hume and other Augustans, seemed by some strange social alchemy to be, in favorable circumstances, politically and economically beneficial. Of course, if this theory is correct, one still cannot fix up historical circumstances to provide such a favorable baseline: we cannot manipulate history that much. Perhaps we do not need to do so: civil society, once its charms have been underwritten by a highly conspicuous demonstration of just what happens when it is absent, does come to be ardently desired, at any rate by many. Can that desire be satisfied in the unfavorable circumstances —existing overconcentration of power, acute economic malaise, explosive ethnic confrontations —in which those who yearn for it are now trying to bring it into being? This is the question of the moment.

No one knows the answer. The attempt at a deliberate erection, by some kind of conscious social engineering, of civil society out of, not exactly the ruins, but the shabby squalor of failed Marxist society, is something totally novel in human history. To dogmatize concerning whether or not it can be done seems to me
utterly absurd, Many have nevertheless allowed themselves such
dogmatism. This cannot succeed, they announce, sometimes with
glee. The glee is repulsive. Some of these schadenfreude-imbued
pessimists are erstwhile Stalinists. Their amply justified hatred of
the horrors of the Marxist Umma, and of the atrocities it com-
mitted, lead them to an unjustified and self-indulgent wallowing
in the prognostications of gloom, offered in the tones of a kind of
confident, knowing Marxism-in-reverse, insinuating that they pos-
sess a private line to history.

The genuine reasons for pessimism and fear are only too mani-
fest. The switch from government by command and fiat to a gov-
ernment by consent and persuasion, which abjured the locally time-
honored and brutal methods of securing compliance, in circum-
stances combining acute ethnic tension with economic deteriora-
tion, can hardly be easy. It may well turn out to be disastrous.
These considerations are, alas, only too evident, and it is hardly
necessary to remind anyone of their relevance. But there are also
some considerations operative on the other side, and it is worth-
while remembering them too.

Ever since sometime in the nineteenth century, the Russian
intelligentsia has been involved, more perhaps than that of any
other third-world country, in a passionate love affair with the
ideals of the Enlightenment. This endearing passion is still there.
It did not bring about the present attempt to set up civil society —
the honor of that initium must go to the economic failure of
Marxist society — but, once the movement has started, it is playing
an important role. Only civil society can satisfy that passion.

Second, the role of economic considerations is not quite as
simple as is often supposed. Given the continued deterioration of
the economy, and given the enormous difference in living stan-
dards between the USSR and the West, observers — and partici-
pants — are sometimes inclined to talk as if the Soviets had, eco-
nomically speaking, nothing to lose but their queues. Not so. The
majority among them are not hungry or cold, are decently clad,
are not too badly housed, and are, if not well educated, at any rate educated. The standards may be low compared with the West, but they are not low compared with the past, and people are aware of it. They do stand to lose something. Connected with this is the question of the state of the Russian soul. This is a secret—not really a state secret, because the state does not know it either. If the lid is taken off, if the habit of obedience is broken once it is fully obvious that it is no longer easy or intended to govern by mowing down people, will a savage Slav beast emerge and indulge in an orgy of pogroms? Or will we encounter, on the contrary, a politically sophisticated and mature citizen, such as, it is claimed, could be observed among the members of the strike committees of the bitterly disaffected miners in 1989? Will this emerging industrialized muzhik opt for a right-wing populist dictatorship, or rather, in terms invented by way of a joke by Jaroslav HaXek (the creator of Good Soldier Švejk), for a Party of Mild Progress within the Limits of the Law?

No one knows. During the year I spent in the USSR, Sergey Bulgakov’s once-banned Heart of the Dog was having a succès fou in Moscow, in various dramatized versions, being played both on television and in two separate theaters. The message of this parable is basically pessimistic: after a transplant of a human brain into a dog, in the end the heart of the dog prevails over human reason, not without amusing episodes along the way. The audience found it all hilarious and thought it applied to its own condition, as far as I could judge. But its sense of humor concerning the situation points in the opposite direction. Is it at least possible to hope that this parable no longer applies? The prophets of gloom may of course yet be proved right. But if the pessimistic forecast comes to pass, it will not be because they really knew they were right. It would simply be that they stumbled on the regrettable truth. But we do not yet know that indeed they did. Perhaps they are wrong. Hope remains rationally permissible, and I for one will continue to indulge in it.